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Abstract
In this position paper we advocate soware model checking as a
technique suitable for security analysis of mobile apps. Our rec-
ommendation is based on promising results that we achieved on
analysing app collusion in the context of the Android operating
system. Broadly speaking, app collusion appears when, in perform-
ing a threat, several apps are working together, i.e., they exchange
information which they could not obtain on their own. In this con-
text, we developed theK-Android tool, which provides an encoding
of the Android/Smali code semantics within the K framework. K-
Android allows for soware model checking of Android APK les.
ough our experience so far is limited to collusion, we believe the
approach to be applicable to further security properties as well as
other mobile operating systems.
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1 Introduction
We advocate as a promising research direction: applying soware
model checking to Android apps for formal security analysis. is
uses abstract model checking, which is an abstract interpretation
technique. Here, we have already achieved a number of explorative
results. ese include: dening and experimenting with two ex-
ecutable semantics on the byte-code level, one concrete and one
abstract. Both of them have been implemented in the K-Android
tool [4, 7], utilising the K framework [12] where Java/JVM seman-
tics had already been dened [6]. Our work targets however the
byte-code level and Android operating system (ART/Dalvik); the
work-ow of K-Android is described in Fig. 1. Currently we are
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Figure 1. Work-ow for model checking with the K framework.
pioneering (w.r.t. the formal executable semantics for a virtual ma-
chine targeted by Java) a formal proof utilizing a simulation relation
that these two semantics are in a sound relation.
In the followings we discuss a number of decisions underlying
the suggested approach, give a brief status report on our research,
and conclude by providing some insights that we gained.
Related work: Our work is closest to static analysis tools that
detect security properties in Android. For example, the tool Flow-
Droid [3] uses taint analysis to nd connections between source
and sink. e app inter-component communication paern is sub-
sequently analysed using a composite constant propagation tech-
nique [11]. We propose a similar approach, namely to track (sensi-
tive) information ow and to detect app communication, but using
model checking that gives witness traces in case of collusion detec-
tion. From the proof eort perspective, we mention CompCert [9]
that uses Coq theorem prover to validate a C compiler. Also, an
up-to-date survey on app collusion in Android can be found in [5].
2 Decisions
When seing up our framework for soware model checking, we
took a number of decisions that we conceive to be fundamental:
Verify byte-code rather than high level language programs
When considering the language level, the input language of the vir-
tual machine appears to be the right level for investigating security
properties. Users download their apps as APKs hence this needs to
be the starting point for our investigation. Decompiling APKs is a
possibility however not 100% successful. A further advantage is that
a language such as Smali, which was designed to run on a Virtual
Machine, is far less complex than a high-level language such as Java.
Finally, Smali programs are independent of compiler optimisations:
verication addressing specic Java constructs might fail on the
byte code level as compiler optimisations might interfere.
Oer two semantics: a concrete and an abstract one We be-
lieve it to be essential to work with two dierent semantics. Objec-
tives of formulating a concrete semantics include:
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C-O1 To be close to the informal description of the language
instructions to ease modelling. For Android these are Smali
instructions as specied on the Android Project website [1].
C-O2 To work with actual values as much as possible: this
allows to experiment with small example programs in order
to validate the given semantics. Note that the K framework
allows for executable specications.
Objectives of formulating an abstract semantics include:
A-O1 To enable eective model checking by selecting suitable
abstraction principles. In K-Android we have chosen:
• virtual unrolling: this leads to nite ows [10];
• memory abstraction: to reduce the state space [2];
• constant propagation: this abstracts from concrete val-
ues and thus also helps in reducing the state space [8].
A-O2 To be sound w.r.t. the security property under discus-
sion, in our case: collusion.
Provide a soundness proof In order to certify the correctness
of the overall approach, a soundness proof is needed. ough the
eort required in carrying out such a proof might appear as a high
price to pay, the overall setup has a number of advantages:
• e proof is done once; the savings of the abstract seman-
tics in time and space apply every time model checking is
carried out; moreover, the proof is re-usable as it is struc-
tured according to classes of Smali instructions – even when
changing the property, the abstract semantics for some of
these classes would stay the same.
• Working with a single semantics confuses objectives, namely
to be true to the informal descriptions (c.f. C-O1 and C-O2)
and, at the same time to be eective (c.f. A-O1). is confu-
sion might compromise the overall objective of providing a
reliable analysis tool (c.f. A-O2).
3 Current Status of our work
Semantics core
Loading
Syntax
Starting
Invoke/return
Read/write
Arithmetics
Control
Figure 2. Semantic module structure.
In our tool K-Android [4, 7], we implement experimental ver-
sions of a concrete and an abstract semantics, which both cover the
whole Smali language–see Figure 2 for the chosen module structure.
We have successfully applied our tool to a number of Android apps
to analyse them for collusion. Here, the counter-example traces
provided by the model checking give good guidance for the code-
analysis that distinguishes between collusion and false positives.
Our correctness proof is ”well on its way”–we covered the core
constructs, e.g., method calls and returns. Although the sheer
number of cases to consider (Smali has about 220 instructions)
makes the proof time consuming, we classied the instructions in
about 20 groups that share a similar build. is modularisation
provides the proof with exibility and reusability characteristics.
4 First insights
Concerning the question if it would be possible to directly build a
suitable abstract semantics, our experience suggests that the two
step approach including a proof is a necessity. In our ongoing
proof, we learned that in some cases our originally implemented
semantics went wrong. Reecting on the abstraction via a formal
simulation relation helped us to nd the correct semantic clauses.
Concerning the applicability of our approach, experiments with
our concrete and abstract semantics indicate that, provided an
astute abstraction, soware model checking for security is feasible
and might even scale even for demanding properties as collusion.
5 Conclusion
Our ongoing work demonstrates that soware model checking is a
viable technique for analysing mobile apps for security. Verication
times are below a minute for small examples consisting of about
5K lines of Smali code. e concrete semantics provided as well
as the abstraction principles applied can be re-used to investigate
further security properties. ough K-Android is tailored to the
Android operating system, the concepts in other mobile operating
systems such as Symbian, MeeGo, iOS, Android, Tizen, etc. appear
to be similar enough that it should be possible to apply soware
model checking also in their context. Compared to the predominant
static analysis methods traditionally applied in mobile security
verication, especially the possibility to obtain counter-example
traces makes soware model checking a promising approach.
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